Comparing Louisiana and Florida's Sugar Markets Postbellum

            In postbellum America, the domestic sugar industry underwent a plethora of changes emerging globally as foreign markets began competing with domestic sugar producers. The development of the beet sugar industry in Europe turned the domestic American sugar production on its head. According to one study, cane sugar accounted for ninety-five percent of the world supply of sugar in 1840 but was dwarfed in 1889 by beet sugar, which accounted for two-thirds of the world’s sugar production.[1] Additionally, as beet sugar was gaining traction in Europe and Congress’ establishment of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) prompted the Florida Everglades to become the prime location for their interests in sugar to be explored further. Although the changing global sugar market greatly effected all domestic sugar producers, Florida and Louisiana’s sugar production was effected greatly by their differing origins and preexisting market practices.

Utilized in this examination of postbellum sugar markets in Florida and Louisiana were several historical and economic studies as well as an extended historical narrative expanding on the Florida sugar market. Mark Schmitz’s studies in economic, historical, and agricultural history provide multifaceted insights into the postbellum sugar situation in Louisiana. In Schmitz’s 1976 paper, he evaluates the changing labor market conditions to assess the effect labor possessed on the development of the sugar industry in Louisiana. Gail Hollander’s study, “Securing Sugar”, approaches the subject of national security and food self-sufficiency as it effected the establishment of Florida as a critical sugar producing region through the analysis of primary sources and printed texts such as promotional materials, government documents, and congressional testimonials.[2] Hollander’s extended narrative, Raising Canes in the ‘Glades”, continues her study in the same manner, but expands into the late twentieth century. All sources discussed bellow are appropriate to the comparison between Louisiana and Floridian sugar industries as they discuss the changing market that both were subject to in postbellum era America, but highlight the unique conditions that separated the two as individual markets part of a larger machine.

            Following the Civil War, Louisiana's sugar industry shifted to separate agricultural and manufacturing as individual stages in production, and there was an increase in the refining process resulting in a preference for granulated sugar over raw brown sugar.[3] As evaluated in Mark Schmitz’s article, “Postbellum Developments in the Louisiana Cane Sugar Industry”, These factors are a direct result of changing labor practices as emancipation required corporations to alter their labor practices. Schmitz posits that postbellum era sugar production in Louisiana was rooted in recovering from a detrimental blow to the industry after the war, and recovery would take a significant amount of time.[4] Schmitz concludes that the labor shortage resulting from abolition was a direct cause for the sugar manufacturers to locate alternative growers as well as alternatives to newly obsolete technology in producing refined granulated sugar, which was becoming more profitable in the industry.[5]

           

            In contrast to Louisiana's sugar, Florida’s industry was stalled due to natural barriers to development such as a lack of population, infrastructure, and preexisting capital. Despite the vast opportunity for land acquisition, sugar magnates were reluctant to invest in building the necessary functions for a thriving sugar industry in Florida.[6] Gail Hollander’s book, Raising Cane in the ‘Glades: The Global Sugar Trade and the Transformation of Florida, establishes Florida's expansive marshes as ripe for the taking. With the passing of the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850, twenty-two million out of thirty-five million Floridian acres were given from the federal government to the state of Florida.[7] Sugar ventures in the state were modest, but lobbyists had a dream for Florida to become the nation’s saving grace from foreign sugar. Harvey W. Wiley, chief chemist for the USDA between 1883 and 1912, was a major proponent of sugar experimentation and champion of the domestic sugar industry. Hollander states, “In support of his work, Congress allotted $424,500 to the USGA for sugar experiments during the decade ending in 1890, a decade in which sugar boosterism became infused with the spirit of agrarian populism.”[8] Florida would be a unique player in the advancement of growing practices across America, and an example of early governmental investment in the growth of domestic markets.

            

            The impact of foreign markets, the changing political landscape in America, and the expanding fiscal power of the American government have great impacts in the Florida and Louisiana sugar industries. Louisiana’s setbacks following abolition prompted a complete overhaul of production and manufacturing practices. Floridian underdevelopment was a major setback for the sugar industry in the peninsula. The shared struggle over foreign sugar markets impacting domestic sugar production united the states in the shared goal of product self-sufficiency.

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[1] Hollander, “Securing Sugar“, 344.

[2] Ibid., 343.

[3] Schmitz, “Postbellum Developments in the Louisiana Cane Sugar Industry”, Department of Economics, University of Delaware, 88.

[4] Ibid., 89.

[5] Schmitz, 98.

[6] Hollander, Raising Cane in the ‘Glades: The Global Sugar Trade and the Transformation of Florida, 22.

[7] Ibid.,

[8] Ibid., 36.

Work Cited:

• Hollander, Gail M. "Securing Sugar: National Security Discourse and the Establishment of Florida's Sugar-Producing Region." Economic Geography 81, no. 4 (2005): 339-358.

Hollander, Gail M. Raising Cane in the  ’Glades the Global Sugar Trade and the Transformation of Florida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Schmitz, Mark D. “Postbellum Developments in the Louisiana Cane Sugar Industry.” Business and Economic History 5 (1976): 88–101. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23702782.